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THE USE OF $\mu\eta$ IN QUESTIONS

BY FRANK COLE BABBITT

IN Greek grammars the statement is regularly made that questions introduced by $\mu\eta$ expect the answer 'no.' Some time ago I became sceptical regarding the truth of this statement, and more recently I took occasion to note from my reading examples of the use of $\mu\eta$ in questions. I became, in time, convinced that the use of $\mu\eta$ in questions (except in purely rhetorical questions) does not, as a rule, expect the answer 'no,' but that its use shows the same fundamental distinction which always exists between $\sigma\upsilon$ and $\mu\eta$, namely, that $\sigma\upsilon$ is used in questions of fact, while in other questions (e.g. questions of possibility) $\mu\eta$ is used.

Thus we have at least four forms of questions, (1) the simple verb with no introductory word: as $\tilde{\nu}\epsilon\iota$; 'is it raining?' i.e. asking merely for information; (2) $\sigma\upsilon\chi\ \tilde{\nu}\epsilon\iota$; 'is it not raining?' i.e. I think it is raining, but pray tell me if it is *not*, questioning merely the fact of rain or no rain; (3) $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\eta\pi\omicron\nu\ \tilde{\nu}\epsilon\iota$; 'it is 'nt raining is it?' i.e. I think it is not; (4) $\mu\eta$ (or $\mu\omega\nu$) $\tilde{\nu}\epsilon\iota$; 'is it not possible that it is raining?' i.e. among other possibilities. But the context may show that the speaker is already acquainted with the facts, and asks the question in a purely rhetorical manner; in such case $\mu\eta\ \tilde{\nu}\epsilon\iota$ must mean 'is it possible that it is raining!' implying of course the answer 'no.' A brief examination of some of the examples (they do not pretend to be exhaustive) will, I think, suffice to make this matter clear.

In the *Odyssey* (6, 199) Nausicaa says to her companions:

στῆτέ μοι, ἀμφίπολοι· πόσε φεύγετε φῶτα ἰδοῦσαι;
ἦ μή πού τινα δυσμενέων φάσθ' ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν;

Here the most natural reason for this running away was because, for the moment, they thought Odysseus unfriendly, and so Nausicaa naturally asks if this is the reason (among other possible reasons) why they are running away; but she certainly did not expect the answer 'no,' else she

would not have proceeded to explain, as she does in the following lines, why such a reason for fear was groundless.

So also in the *Odyssey* (9, 405-6), the Cyclopes ask Polyphemus why he is crying out so loudly, and further ask :

ἢ μή τίς σευ μῆλα βροτῶν ἀέκοντος ἐλαύνει;
ἢ μή τίς σ' αὐτὸν κτείνει δόλῳ ἢ βίῃφι;

That is, are the reasons (among other possible reasons) for his crying out the ones that they state? These are the possibilities that occur to their minds, and Polyphemus answers affirmatively that one of these suggested possibilities is what is really taking place, but, owing to the playing on the word οὗτις, the Cyclopes understand that neither of the suggestions is right; hence they conclude that Polyphemus must be afflicted by a heaven-sent plague, since they can think of nothing else on earth that could be hurting him. (I cannot at all agree with Mr. Monro in this matter (*H. G.* § 358 C) either in regard to the "strong form of denial uttered in a hesitant or interrogative tone" or in regard to the "incredulity" expressed in such a question. If any incredulity is expressed, it lies in the ἢ and not in the μή. Cf. *Od.* 5, 415, quoted below.

In Plato's *Apology* (24 D-25 A) Socrates is endeavoring to discover who, according to Meletus' ideas, are the corrupters of the youth, and he sets about his task by trying first to learn who are able to improve the youth. He learns successively that all the members of the court, the audience, and the members of the Senate, exert an improving influence. Socrates has now reduced the possible corrupters to within very narrow limits, and asks Meletus if the members of the Assembly may not be the guilty ones. His words are¹: ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μή οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ . . . διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκῃνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Whether this be regarded as a single or a double question makes no difference for us, for we are concerned only with the first part, which, like other questions introduced by μή, does not

¹ Interesting is Dyer's note on this passage, for he apparently saw the truth, yet could not refrain from quoting the set phrase of the grammars. He says: "Questions with μή take a negative answer for granted. . . . 'Somebody in Athens is corrupting the youth. We have seen that it is nobody else, hence *possibly it is these gentlemen.*' But this is absurd," etc.

expect the answer 'no,' but merely queries the possibilities. The only ground on which this question could be said to expect the answer 'no,' is that it may be regarded as a rhetorical question, since the context shows that Socrates has probably already made up his mind on the subject; such questions will be treated further on. Other examples are Xen. *Oec.* 12, 1, where Socrates politely asks Ischomachus whether possibly he may not be detaining him, in case he has other matters to attend to (as he might very likely have).

Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, μή σε κατακωλύω, ὦ Ἰσχόμαχε, ἀπείναι ἤδη βουλόμενον;

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4, 2, 10) are numerous questions in rapid succession, each introduced by μή. It is customary in the grammars to quote partially the second of these alone (or the second or third) as a proof that such questions expect a negative answer, but such a method of quotation does enormous violence to the proper understanding of the passage, since in several of the questions Socrates (with no irony) adds a reason for expecting an affirmative answer. It is worth while to quote the passage at length :

τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγεις τὰ γράμματα; ἐπεὶ δὲ διεσιώπησεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος σκοπῶν ὅτι ἀποκρίναιτο, πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἄρα μή ἱατρός; ἔφη. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἱατρῶν ἐστὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλὰ μή ἀρχιτέκτων βούλη γενέσθαι; γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ. οὐκ οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ μή γεωμέτρης ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἔφη, γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸς, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος; Οὐδὲ γεωμέτρης, ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ μή ἀστρολόγος, ἔφη, γενέσθαι; Ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡρνεῖτο, Ἄλλὰ μή ραψῳδός; ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τὰ Ὀμήρου σέ φασιν ἔπη πάντα κεκτῆσθαι. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τοὺς γὰρ τοὶ ραψῳδοὺς οἶδα, κτλ.

The sense of the passage as I understand it is this: Socrates asks Euthydemus in what he desires to excel that he is collecting so many books. Does he wish to be a physician? — their compilations are very voluminous; or an architect? — they, too, must be well provided with a store of knowledge (such as Euthydemus might obtain from his books) — and so on, until finally he asks (remembering that Euthydemus is said to possess a copy of Homer entire) whether he may not be intending

to employ his copy of Homer in learning to be a rhapsodist. In none of these questions is there the slightest suggestion that the expected answer will be 'no,' unless we assume (wrongly, as it seems to me) that Socrates is talking ironically, in which case these questions come under the head of rhetorical questions, which will be considered later.

No argument is to be drawn from the fact that all these questions *happen* to be answered in the negative. An equal number of questions containing μή can be produced in which the answer *happens* to be affirmative.

Two other examples from Plato, *Euthydemus*, of past tenses with μή are quoted by Kühner (§ 589, Anmerk. 5), who tries, however, to explain them by an ellipsis of a word of fearing.

In a fragment also of Plato's *Παιδρίον* (quoted in the scholium on Aristoph. *Pax* 948), if the text be right, μή is used in a question expecting the answer 'yes.' The fragment is:

φέρει τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ
δεῖξον τὸ κανοῦν
μοι δεῦρο· μή μάχαιρ' ἐνι;

The scholiast quotes this in proof of his statement immediately preceding, that the knife was regularly concealed in the basket beneath the barley and the fillets. Hence it is fair to infer that the person who asked μή μάχαιρ' ἐνι; really expected to find a knife there.

So in Aeschyl. *Suppl.* 292 μή καὶ λόγος τις Ζῆνα μυχθῆναι βροτῶ is followed by an affirmative answer, as might naturally be expected.

That μή may be found in company with other (quasi) interrogative words (ἄρα μή, ἦ μή, μή οὖν = μῶν) retaining its regular meaning needs hardly more than to be stated. Some examples of ἄρα μή and ἦ μή have, for convenience, already been given in treating of μή. It will suffice therefore to mention only one more example.¹

In Plato's *Crito*, 44 E, Crito asks Socrates ἄρά γε μή ἐμοῦ προμηθῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσι, κτλ., and goes on to assure him that he need have no anxiety on that account, for the task of rescue is by no means so difficult for them as Socrates thinks. Plainly Crito thinks that

¹ Other examples may be found in Kühner's *Grammatik*, § 587, 14.

Socrates must have some anxiety on their account, else he would not give reasons why Socrates need not feel anxious. Consequently the affirmative answer (45 λ) καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά is exactly what Crito expects.

So also μῶν (like simple μή) inquires merely as to possibilities, and may quite as frequently be followed by an affirmative as by a negative answer. Thus in the *Pax* (746) Aristophanes boasts that he has driven from the stage, among other things, those who intentionally get a beating,

ὃν ὁ σύνδουλος σκώψας αὐτοῦ τὰς πληγὰς εἰτ' ἀνέροιτο
 "ὦ κακόδαιμον, τί τὸ δέριμ' ἔπαυες; μῶν ὑστριχὺς εἰσὶ βάλαν
 σοι, κτλ."

Here, exactly as in the *Odyssey* passages quoted above, the question is concerning the first natural supposition that enters the speaker's mind in explanation of the circumstances. The supposition may turn out to be right or wrong, but the speaker, in choosing the most reasonable explanation that occurs to his mind, shows that he thinks it more likely to be right than wrong, and hence would be less disappointed by an affirmative than by a negative answer.

In Aristophanes' *Acharnians* 418 Dicaeopolis visits Euripides in order to borrow a ragged outfit. To his request for such an outfit Euripides replies:

τὰ ποῖα τρύχη; μῶν ἐν οἷς Οἰνέως ὁδοῖ
 ὁ δύσποτμος γεραίως ἡγωνίζετο;

i. e. 'What rags? [I have numerous outfits that would meet his requirements] does he very likely want those of Oeneus? [they ought to be satisfactory].' And Dicaeopolis replies that '[the rags of Oeneus may have been very admirable in their way, but] they were not the ones he had in mind, etc.'

Other examples of μῶν in addition to those quoted by Kühner¹ are:

Soph. *Aj.* 791: οἱμοι, τί φής, ἄνθρωπε; μῶν δώλωμεν;

¹ Kühner, § 587, 12, where he admits that μῶν seems sometimes to expect an affirmative answer (*scheint μῶν eine bejahende Frage einzuleiten*). The other examples of μῶν in Aristophanes are most conveniently consulted in Dunbar's *Concordance*.

'Are we undone? [I have been anticipating all the time that this might happen].'

Eurip. *I. T.* 551: τί δ' ἰστίναξας τοῦτο; μὴν προσῆκέ σοι;

'Why this lament? was he a relative of yours? [it is incomprehensible to me that he should have been, but otherwise I fail to understand why you should be affected by his fate].'

Lucian, *Timon*, 57 *ad fin.*: τί ἀγανακτεῖς, ὦγαθε; μὴν τι παρακέρουσαι σε; καὶ μὴν ἐπεμβαλῶ χόινικας ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τέτταρας. 'What's the matter? Have I cheated you? [Well, perhaps I have, so] here's a trifle in addition to the regular measure, etc.'

It is now perhaps time to ask how it happens that μή is used (and of this there can be no doubt) in questions expecting the answer 'no'; and the explanation is perfectly simple, that such questions are purely rhetorical,¹ and expect the answer 'no' not because of the μή, but because of the context. Moreover, it should be added that questions expecting a negative answer may be introduced by other words as well as by μή. An example of a rhetorical question of this sort is in Aeschylus, *Prom.* 959, where, prophesying the overthrow of the new ruler (Ζεύς) in a manner even worse and more swift than that of his predecessors, Prometheus asks Hermes:

μή τί σοι δοκῶ
ταρβεῖν ὑποπτήσσειν τε τοὺς νέους θεούς;

The question, as the context shows, is only a stronger way of saying "You plainly see I have no fear of fledgeling gods," and hence is purely rhetorical, expecting a negative answer.

So also in Plato's *Apology*, 28 D, Socrates is arguing that one should not shirk his duty because of fear of death, and quotes the example of Achilles 'who made light of death and danger, but much more feared to live a coward's life, saying "Let me die straightway when I have taken vengeance on the offender," etc.' Socrates then continues: μή αὐτὸν οἷα φροντίζειν θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; 'Think you (i.e. is it

¹ That no two persons will agree as to what is and what is not a rhetorical question is only to be expected, but disagreement in regard to the classification does not prevent agreement about the general principle involved.

possible that you think) that *he* had any thought of death and danger !'
'Of course not.'

But in these questions the expectation of a negative answer is not inherent in the μή, but is deduced from the entire context. Such a question can be asked equally well without μή, as in Plato, *Apology*, 37 D, when Socrates, after saying that his own citizens have become tired of his presence, asks: ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς αἴσουσι ῥαδίως; plainly expecting the answer 'no,' for he adds, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι.

So also in Aristoph. *Ran.* 526 οὐ δὴ που μ' ἀφελέσθαι διανοεῖ|ᾤδωκας αὐτός; "surely you don't intend, etc?" gets its meaning from the context. (Other examples: *Av.* 269, *Nub.* 1260, *Pax* 1211, *Ach.* 122, *Ecc.* 327.)

A hint as to the origin of μή in questions is given by the fact that μή alone (without another interrogative word) is rare before the time of Aeschylus. This seems to point to the fact that the interrogative μή is nothing but the ordinary negative adverb μή used in an interrogative sentence precisely as οὐ is used, but, since the question was not concerned with *fact*, the keen sense of the Greek forbade him to use the regular negative of facts, and the result was the use of μή. On this supposition (which seems extremely reasonable) ἄρα μή ὕει; would mean "May it perhaps not be raining?" while οὐχ ὕει would mean "Is it not raining?" Later, of course, μή alone came to be felt as a sufficient interrogative.

This then concludes the main part of the thesis: that μή in questions does not regularly expect the answer 'no,' but, on the contrary, often awaits an affirmative answer. To make the treatment complete it should be stated that μή can be used to introduce the first part of a double (or alternative) question, and that it is also found (with or without other words) in indirect questions both simple and double. For these facts it will be sufficient to quote a very few examples.

*Double Direct Question.*¹ — Soph. *O. C.* 1502 :

μή τις Διὸς κεραυνός, ἢ τις ὀμβρία
χάλαξ' ἐπιπράσσα . . . ;

i. e. 'is it perhaps thunder or a hail-storm . . . ?'

¹ Cf. also Plato, *Phaed.* 78 D; *Rep.* 442 D, 466 A, 479 B, 436 E, quoted by Kühner.

Indirect Questions.—The frequent use of simple μή in indirect questions seems to have been a comparatively late development. See Kühner's *Grammar*, § 589, Anmerk 2. This usage, however, is not unknown in classical Greek, but it is customary to explain such examples by assuming that there is some idea of fearing implied in the words on which such questions depend; and it is not to be denied that some of the examples¹ will admit this explanation, but, from the original significance of μή in questions (i.e. uncertainty or apprehension, as I have tried to show above) it could not be used as a colorless interrogative, but its use would naturally be confined to questions suggesting uncertainty or apprehension. The following examples seem to be clear cases of questions.

Eurip. *Orest.* 209 :

ὄρα παροῦσα, παρθέν' Ἥλέκτρα, πῆλας
μή κατθανών σε σύγγονος λείλθ' ὅδε.

i.e. 'see whether he may not perhaps have died.'

Soph. *Ant.* 1253 :

ἀλλ' εἰσόμεσθα μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον
κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ θυμουμένη
δόμους παραστείχοντες.

Ibid. 278 :

"Ἀναξ ἰμοί τοι μή τι καὶ θεήλατον
τοῦργον τόδ', ἢ ξύννοια βουλευεῖ πάλαι.

Eurip. *Her.* 481 :

κάμαντῆς περὶ
θέλω πυθίσθαι μή 'πὶ τοῖς πάλαι κακοῖς
προσκέμενον τι πῆμα σὴν δάκνει φρένα.

'on my own account

I also wish to hear if any ill,
Added to those you have already suffered,
Torture your soul.' — *Woodhull.*

Cf. also *I. T.* 67, *Phoen.* 93.

¹ See Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 369, 1.

The general tendency of verbs of this sort to be followed by an indirect question has been demonstrated by Professor Hale in his article on the Anticipatory Subjunctive in Vol. I of the *Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*.

There can be no doubt as to the use of μή in later Greek as an indirect interrogative, and it is not unreasonable to believe that its use in this way was developed along the same lines as its use as a direct interrogative (see page 313), and that, from being used at first in company with another interrogative word (εἰ), it later came to be regarded as an interrogative word by itself. The question then merely resolves itself into this, viz. how early we are to admit the use of μή as an indirect interrogative; to my mind the indicatives in the examples just cited are easier explained as questions than in any other way (see below, page 317).

From later Greek, an example of μή as an indirect interrogative (in addition to those cited by Kühner, § 589, Anmerk 2) is Herondas 1, 2, where, if Blass' restoration be right, the reading is:

οὐκ ὄψει
μ[ή τις] παρ' ἡμέων ἐξ ἀγροικίης ἦκει;

Usually, however, μή in indirect questions is found in company with εἰ, as Plato, *Theaet.* 163 d: βουλόμενος εἰρεῖσθαι εἰ . . . μή οἶδεν.

Aristoph. *Pax* 1292:

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ θαύμαζον ἀκούων εἰ σὺ μή εἴης
ἀνδρὸς βουλομάχου καὶ κλαυσιμάχου τινὸς νιός.

Double Indirect Questions.—Plato, *Crat.* 425 B, εἴτε κατὰ τρόπον κείται εἴτε μή, οὕτω θεᾶσθαι.

It is often a nice question whether μή or οὐ shall be used, and apparently the *feeling* of the speaker as to whether the question is one of *fact* or not may serve to decide. Thus, in Antiph. 5, 14, μή and οὐ, respectively, are used in successive similar questions:

οὐ δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγοροῦ λόγων τοὺς νόμους καταμάνθανειν, εἰ καλῶς ὑμῖν κείνται ἢ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νόμων τοὺς τοῦ κατηγοροῦ λόγους, εἰ ὀρθῶς καὶ νομίμως ὑμᾶς διδάσκει το πρᾶγμα ἢ οὐ.

In regard to the mood of the verb found in questions with μή, it is of course usually the indicative, but there can be no doubt that the

indicative in such questions may be replaced by the "anticipatory subjunctive" (if this name be pleasing). Thus in Hom. *Od.* 5, 415:

μή πώς μ' ἐκβαίνοντα βάλῃ λίθακι προτὶ πέτρῃ
κύμα μέγ' ἀρπάξαν;

And *Od.* 5, 356:

ὦ μοι ἐγώ, μή τίς μοι ὑφαίνησιν δόλον αὔτε
ἀθανάτων,

it is extremely difficult to explain the subjunctives as regular "dubitative subjunctives with the negative μή," since the question emphatically is not negative.¹ So also in Aesch. *Cho.* 177:

μὲν οὖν Ὀρέστου κρύβδα δῶρον ἦ τόδε;

where many editors, without sufficient reason, change ἦ to ἦν.

Plato, *Phaed.* 64 c ἄρα μή ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἦ τοῦτο;

Xen. *Oec.* 4, 4 Ἄρα, εἴφῃ ὁ Σωκράτης, μή αἰσχυνθῶμαι τὸν Περσῶν βασιλεία μμῆσασθαι;

This last example is regularly quoted as an example of the deliberative subjunctive, and to me there seems to be little doubt that, in origin, all of these lie very closely together.²

If the subjunctive can be used in direct questions, it naturally follows that it can be used also in indirect questions, such as Plato, *Phaed.* 91 D, τόδε ἀδελον παντὶ μή πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται. Moreover, I can see no conclusive reason against explaining in the same way similar expressions in Homer, e. g. *Iliad* 10, 100-1:

δυσμενείες δ' ἄνδρες σχεδὸν ἦται, οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν
μή πως καὶ διὰ νύκτα μωνιήσῃσι μάχεσθαι.

¹ Other possible examples are:

Iliad 2, 195 μή τι χολωσάμενος βέξῃ . . . ;

Iliad 5, 487 μή πως . . . ἔλωρ καὶ κύμα γένησθε;

(Observe the subjunctive and future indicative.)

Iliad 22, 123 μή μιν ἐγὼ μὲν ἱκώμαι ἰών, εἰ δέ μ' οὐκ ἐλεήσει;

Odyssey 18, 334 μή τίς τοι τάχα Ἴρην ἀμείνων ἄλλος ἀναστή;

These are often explained (so Monro) as a phase of the imperative use of the subjunctive, or perhaps more frequently by postulating an ellipsis of some word of fearing. Neither of these explanations seems to me quite satisfactory for any great number of the examples.

² See Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 293.

Finally, I ought not to omit a suggestion that, if we admit the preceding facts, they may have some bearing on the explanation of μή, μή οὐ, and οὐ μή with the subjunctive (or future indicative), and the construction with words of fearing.

According to this explanation μή ἔστιν χαλεπόν; would mean 'Is it not perhaps difficult?' μή ἢ χαλεπόν; 'may there not perhaps be a possibility of its being difficult?' μή οὐκ ἢ χαλεπόν; 'may there not be a possibility of its not being difficult?' (cf. above p. 316), while in οὐ μή ἢ χαλεπόν the οὐ at the outset denies absolutely the possibility suggested by μή ἢ χαλεπόν.

In regard to the construction of the words of fearing, if we admit the customary explanation of parataxis, it is hard to see how in expressions like *Od.* 5, 300, δίδω μή δὴ πάντα θεὰ ἡμερτέα εἶπεν, the expression μή . . . εἶπεν, as an independent clause, can be anything but a question introduced by μή, and if we admit the subjunctive in such questions we shall have one and the same simple explanation of both indicative and subjunctive after words of fearing.

I am well aware that both these questions and these explanations are far from novel, but I mention them in the hope, if the main part of the thesis in regard to questions with μή be found tenable, that some one else may perhaps see, more clearly than I have done, the logical conclusions.

To sum up: if we insist that μή in questions always expects a negative answer, we do not find it easy to explain the cases where μή (contained in μῶν, Kühner, *Grammatik*, § 587, 12) expects an affirmative answer, nor cases of the interrogative subjunctive with μή expecting an affirmative answer (Goodwin, *M. T.* § 293), to say nothing of the "disappearance of the original force of μή" in the subjunctive with μή and μή οὐ (as well as οὐ μή); Goodwin, *M. T.*, p. 391.

Moreover, the assumption of an ellipsis of a verb of fearing to explain independent constructions with μή (p. 316) is contrary to the normal development of language; likewise it is difficult to impute an idea of fear to verbs like οἶδα (p. 314); and, finally, if we explain the subjunctive after verbs of fearing as a phase of the imperative subjunctive, we must adopt another explanation for the indicative after the same verbs.

On the other hand, if we admit that μή in questions does not expect a negative answer, we have one and the same simple explanation for all these different constructions.